出版社:高等教育出版社
年代:2013
定价:49.0
联盟的稳定性是联盟博弈中一个重要的概念。传统的联盟博弈理论是假设每一个代理人的偏好都是公开的,但是在实际应用中,不少软件代理人的应用系统并不符合这个前提,他们往往是拥有私人信念的个体,因此他们不是按照全体代理人拥有的共同信念来行动的。针对以上问题,本书对传统的稳定性概念中的“核”概念进行扩充,提出一套新的概念,分析带有不确定性并且以信念为基础的联盟的稳定性,并展示这套新概念如何应用于一类新的联盟博弈——以信念为本位的联盟博弈。本书可供人工智能和计算机科学领域的研究生、工程师以及研究人员参考。
Chapter 1 Multi-agent Cooperation and Stability
1.1 Semi-competitive Multi-agent Systems
1.1.1 Characteristics of Multi-agent Systems
1.1.2 Two Basic Solution Concepts of Coalition
Formations
1.2 Coalition Formation and Game Theory
1.2.1 Transferable Utility Games
1.2.2 Non-transferable Utility Games
1.3 Problem with the Common Knowledge Assumption
References
Chapter 2 Non-transferable Utility Games and
Coalition Formation Mechanisms
2.1 Non-transferable Utility Cooperative Games
2.2 Transferable Utility Cooperative Games
2.3 Coalition Formation Mechanisms
2.4 Belief and Uncertainties
References
Chapter 3 Two Classes of Stability
-- Strong Core and Weak Core
3.1 Coalition Formation and Stability
3.2 An Example
3.3 NTU Games with Internal Uncertainty
3.4 Opinions and Preferences of Agents
3.5 The Strong Core and the Weak Core
3.6 Effect of Refinedness of Agent Opinions
3.7 Application Areas
3.8 Summary
References
Chapter 4 The b-Core: Belief-based Coalition
Stability
4.1 Games Without Common Knowledge
4.2 Belief-based Coalitional Games
4.3 NTU Games with Private Beliefs
4.4 The Core, the b-Core and Belief Accuracy
4.5 Discussion
4.6 On Dynamic Beliefs
4.7 Summary
References
Chapter 5 Example Application of the b-Core:
Buyer Coalition Problem with Beliefs
5.1 Buyer Coalition Problems
5.1.1 Are the Utility Really Transferable?
5.1.2 How About Stability?
5.1.3 Private Information in Buyer Coalition
5.1.4 Existing Approaches
5.1.5 A New Approach
5.2 Background of Buyer Coalition Problem
5.2.1 Unit Price Schedule and Agent Preference
5.2.2 Agent Beliefs
5.2.3 NTU Buyer Coalition Games
5.2.4 Properties of the b-Core in NTU-Buyer
Games
5.2.5 On Mechanism Design
5.3 A Distributed Mechanism
5.3.1 Distributed Non-transferable Utility Coalition
Formation Mechanism
5.3.2 An Example of the Mechanism
5.4 Experiment
5.4.1 Performance of the Mechanism
5.4.2 Evidence of Incentive Compatibility
5.5 Summary
References
Chapter 6 The Complete Picture: sb-Core and
wb-Core
6.1 Uncertain Opinion and Private Beliefs
6.2 An Illustrating Example
6.3 NTU-BU Games
6.3.1 Preferences and Beliefs in NTU-BU Games
6.3.2 NTU-BU Games Stability
6.4 Properties
6.4.1 Relationships of the Four Criteria
6.4.2 Effect of Refinedness
6.4.3 Effect of Accuracy
6.5 Summary
References
Chapter 7 Conclusion
7.1 New Solution Concepts for Belief-based NTU
Games
7.2 The Future
References
Book References
Index
《不确定性联盟形成中基于信念的稳定性:智能代理的视角(英文版)》安排如下:在第1章中,我们首先提供在博弈论的话题,在这本书中所讨论的概念有关的介绍。在第2章中,我们回顾了一些相关的文学作品,特别是在合作博弈理论和多Agent联盟形成问题。在第3章中,我们将讨论在代理的信念对游戏的稳定性的不确定性的影响。采用以规则为基础的方法和强大的核心和弱核心的概念引入。我们还讨论了信仰联盟的稳定性精度的效果。我们在第4章,不可转让的实用程序(NTU)游戏中引入民间信仰,使代理商的喜好不再是常识。信念精度稳定性的影响也检查....