激励理论

Foreword

Introduction

1 Incentives in Economic'Thought

1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture

1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management

1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem

1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting

1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies

1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance

1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives

1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination

1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies

1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design

1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off

2.1 The Basic Model

2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract

2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts

2.4 Information Rents

2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ

2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off

2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information

2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing

2.9 The Revelation Principle

2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent

2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints

2.12 Commitment

2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms

2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting

2.15 Contract Theory at Work

Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection

3.1 More than Two Types

3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information

3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and

Countervailing Incentives

3.4 Random Participation Constraint

3.5 Limited Liability

3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification

3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off

Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs

4.1 The Model

4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation

……

5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard

6 Nonverifiability

7 Mixed Models

8 Dynamics under Full Commitment

9 Limits and Extensions

Re ferences

Author Index

Subject Index

The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.