公司治理比较研究

ABSTRACT

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

LIST OF STATUTES

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Section 1.1 Research Background

Section 1.2 Research Objectives

Section 1.3 Research Methodology

Section 1.4 Structure of the Book

CHAPTER TWO

AGENCY THEORY VERSUS STAKEHOLDER THEORY

Section 2.1 Introduction

Section 2.2 Agency Theory

2.2.1 Overview of Agency Theory

2.2.2 Agency Conflicts and Solutions

2.2.3 Support and Criticism of Agency Theory

Section 2.3 Stakeholder Theory and Stakeholder Model

2.3.1 Stakeholder Theory

2.3.2 Difficulties and Solutions to Identification of Stakeholders

2.3.3 Difficulties and Solutions to Implementation of Stakeholder

Theory

Section 2.4 Conclusion

CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF STAKEHOLDER THEORY

Section 3.1 Introduction

Section 3.2 Revised Model of Stakeholder Theory

3.2.1 Interest Alignment Mechanisms

3.2.2 Civil Regulation and Social Capital

3.2.3 Statutory Regulation and Legal Enforcement

3.2.4 Justification of Revised Stakeholder Theory Model

Section 3.3 Applying the Model in Germany and the OK

3.3.1 Reasons of Applying the Model in Germany and the UK

3.3.2 Classifying by Legal Systems

3.3.3 Classifying by Corporate Governance Systems

Section 3.4 Five Mechanisms for Protecting Stakeholder Interests

Section 3.5 Conclusion

CHAPTER FOUR

BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN GERMANY AND THE UK

Section 4.1 Introduction

Section 4.2 Board of Directors

4.2.1 Functions of Board of Directors

4.2.2 Composition of Board of Directors

4.2.3 Independence of Board of Directors

4.2.4 Size of Board of Directors

Section 4.3 Board of Directors in Germany

4.3.I Strict Separation of Control and Management

4.3.2 Codetermination between Employees and Shareholders

4.3.3 Monitring Power and Effects of Banks

Section 4.4 Board of Directors in the UK

4.4.1 Weak Independence of Board of Directors

4.4.2 Board Composition without Stakeholder Representatives

4.4.3 Non-Exhaustive Reform of Company Law

Section 4.5 Discussion and Conclusion

CHAPTER FIVE

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN GERMANY AND THE UK

Section 5.1 Introduction

Section 5.2 Supervisory Role of Institutional Investors

5.2.1 Significance of Institutional Investor Activism

5.2.2 Monitoring Incentive of Institutional Investors

5.2.3 Monitoring Ability of Institutional Investors

5.2.4 Possible Barriers of Institutional Investor Activism

5.2.5 Approaches of Institutional Investors for Stakeholder Protection

5.2.6 Impact of SRI Investments on Stakeholder Interests

Section 5.3 Institutional Investors in Germany

5.3.1 Internal Blockholders' Control and Stakeholder Protection

5.3.2 Development of Socially Responsible Investment

5.3.3 Market for Partial Corporate Control

Section 5.4 Institutional Investors in the UK

5.4.1 Increase of Institutional Share Ownership

5.4.2 Institutional Investor Activism and Social Reporting System

5.4.3 Social Performance of Institutional Investors

Section 5.5 Discussion and Conclusion

CHAPTER SIX

MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION SYSTEM IN GERMANY AND THE UK

Section 6.1 Introduction

Section 6.2 Managerial Compensation System

6.2.1 Managerial Compensation and Stakeholder Protection

6.2.2 Managerial Compensation Arrangements and Package

6.2.3 Managerial Performance Measurement

6.2.4 Complementary Effects of Other Governance Mechanisms

6.2.5 Impact of Managerial Compensation on Stakeholder Interests

Section 6.3 Managerial Compensation System in Germany

6.3.1 Development of Managerial Compensation System

6.3.2 Legal Reform of Managerial Compensation System

Section 6.4 Managerial Compensation System in the UK

6.4.1 Remedies for Weak Influence of Stakeholders

6.4.2 Impact of Say-on-Pay Regulation

6.4.3 Civil Regulatory Pressure of Non-Governmental Organisations

Section 6.5 Discussion and Conclusion

CHAPTER SEVEN

MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL IN GERMANY AND THE UK

Section 7.1 Introduction

Section 7.2 Market for Corporate Control

7.2.1 Hostile Takeover and Internal Governance Failure

7.2.2 Barriers of Market for Corporate Control

7.2.3 Takeover Impact on Stakeholder Welfare

Section 7.3 Market for Corporate Control in Germany

7.3.1 Takeover Market and Takeover Regulations

7.3.2 Takeover Barriers in Germany

Section 7.4 Market for Corporate Control in the UK

7.4.1 Takeover Regulations of the UK

7.4.2 Elimination of Takeover Barriers in the UK

7.4.3 Stakeholder Protection in Takeover Process

Section 7.5 Discussion and Conclusion

CHAPTER EIGHT

TRADE UNION AND LABOUR MARKET IN GERMANY AND THE UK

Section 8.1 Introduction

Section 8.2 Trade Union and Labour Market

8.2.1 Governance Role of Employees

8.2.2 Trade Union and Firm Performance

8.2.3 Labour Market and Firm Performance

Section 8.3 Trade Union and Labour Market in Germany

8.3.1 Social and Economic Culture in German Labour Market

8.3.2 Strict Legal Protection for Employment

8.3.3 Collective Agreement and Employee Protection

8.3.4 Strict Employment Protection and Labour Market Flexibility

Section 8.4 Trade Union and Labour Market in the UK

8.4.1 Social and Economic Culture in UK Labour Market

8.4.2 Trade Union Recognition and Employee Protection

8.4.3 Insufficient Rights to Information and Consultation of Employees

8.4.4 Protection to Other Employee Rights and Stakeholder Interests

Section 8.5 Discussion and Conclusion

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION

Section 9.1 Discussion and Contribution

9.1.1 Significance and Completeness of Stakeholder Theory

9.1.2 Significance of Revised Stakeholder Theory Model

9.1.3 Implementation of Stakeholder Theory in Practice

Section 9.2 Possible Limitations of This Research

Section 9.3 Implication for Future Research

REFERENCES

《公司治理比较研究：以修正的利益关系人理论模型解读英德公司治理实践（英文版）》专注于比较研究不同国家（主要是英国和德国）的公司法和公司治理方面的相关法律制度（包括相关的欧盟法规），以及相应法律制度建立的公司治理模式和机制下的利益关系人（如公司的员工，客户，供应商，借款银行，以及所在社区）的权利和福利保护问题。通过改进设计的用于规范公司行为和保护利益关系人利益的公司治理模型（a revised model of stakeholder theory），可以研究发现不同的国家在自己特有的公司治理模式和机制下，采用不同的方法来促使公司在从事商业行为的同时关注商业行为本身的道德与伦理问题，进而促进公司积极的承担社会责任，并有效的保护公司利益关系人的权利和福利。
　　这有利于改善商业（公司）与社会的关系，并且有益于公司的长期和持续的发展。从研究中也可以发现，尽管各国的法律制度和公司治理模式不同，但是多种措施综合使用后的利益关系人保护效果是接近一致的。这也意味着利益关系人理论是可以付诸实际应用的，利益关系人的保护也是可以在不同的公司治理模式下实现的。这个研究主要涉及如下的几个方面，如公司董事会的构成和职能方面的设计，机构投资者参与公司治理的动机，方式和影响，公司高管人员薪酬与社会责任的连接，市场对公司的控制和约束，以及工会组织和其它社会团体对公司的影响和约束力等。